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I' 
• 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Plaintiff, 
NEW YORK CASUALTY COMPA-
NY, a corporation, lnterven01·, 
vs . 
C. V. LACK and CHRIS E. ATHAS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 88819 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is taken on the judgment roll from an order 
of the district court sustaining the defendant Athas' motion 
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint herein. For reasons that will 
be indicated later, the plaintiff elected to stand upon its original 
complaint (R. 21) and took judgment of dismissal as regards 
defendant Athas for purposes of appeal (R. 22). Defend-
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ant C. V. Lack appeared in the case and New York Casualty 
Company intervened, but neither participate in this appeal. 
This action was brought to recover the sum of $37,805.17 
which was lost to the State of Utah through the operation of 
the Brigham Street Pharmacy Liquor Package Agency in the 
years 1946 to 1948. The complaint (R. 1-11) is drafted ac-
cording to the rules of pleading in force prior to the adoption 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It contains two counts 
in conversion, one based upon a partnership theory, the other, 
upon a theory of joint venture. For purposes of this appeal 
we believe the law to be the same as regards each count. Ac-
cording to the allegations contained in this complaint, the 
defendants C. V. Lack and Chris E. Athas operated, at the 
times complained of, as a partnership (or joint venture), 
a retail drug business in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the 
Brigham Street Pharmacy. The complaint further states that 
during the time complained of there was operated in this 
drug store a liquor package agency for the plaintiff pur-
suant to a contract between Lack and the plaintiff (R. 1, 3). 
The complaint, after alleging the partnership (or joint 
venture), sets forth in paragraph 7 of the first count (R. 3) 
and paragraph 7 of the second count (R. 5) that "defendants 
sold and otherwise disposed of liquor belonging to the plain-
tiff of the retail value of $37,805.17, for all of which the 
said defendants failed, neglected and refused to account to 
this plaintiff," but that this sum had been converted by de-
fendants. 
To this complaint the defendant Athas addressed three 
moti~ns, ( 1) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
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relief should be granted, ( 2) for a more definite statement, 
and (3) to strike (R. 16-18). The court granted the said 
defendant's motion to dismiss as regards each count of the 
complaint, sustained the motion for a more definite statement, 
and denied the motion to strike (R. 20), giving plaintiff 
ten days after notice in which to amend. It is plaintiff's po-
sition that this order is in error. 
The complaint is an action for conversion. The theory 
of the plaintiff is that where a conversion occurs in the course 
of operation of a partnership, each partner may be held for 
such conversion. We believe the same rule of procedure pre-
vails under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as formerly, 
that is that facts properly pleaded in the complaint must be 
taken as true under the motions to dismiss. See Nicholson 
Transit Co. v. Bassett, 42 F. Supp. 990. Upon the argument 
of the motion to dismiss counsel for the defendant Athas 
urged two points, one, that there was no allegation contained 
in the complaint that defendant Athas had any knowledge 
of the conversion or participated therein, and second, that an 
action against defendant Athas would not lie in any event 
in view of the provisions of Section 46-0-82, Utah Code An-
notated 1943, which provides among other things, that a 
person contracting with the Liquor Control Commission of 
Utah to operate a package agency for that commission must 
be a "natural person" and that, therefore, no other kind of 
"person" could be held accountable to the Liquor Control 
Commission for conversion. The argument addressed to the 
motion for a more definite statement was aimed at this latter 
point. 
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Plaintiff's position is that if the liquor delivered to the 
Brigham Street Pharmacy was in fact handled in the usual 
course of business of the partnership known as the Brigham 
Street Pharmacy and, if one partner converted a portion 
thereof, then_ all partners may be held liable in a civil action 
for this conversion regardless of knowledge and regardless 
of the statutory restriction as to who may contract with the 
Liquor Control Commission as package agent. 
This theory is fundamental to plaintiffs position so far 
as the defendant Athas is concerned and, rather than amend 
it out of the complaint, plaintiff elected to stand upon that 
theory and take this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE ONE PARTNER, IN -THE COURSE OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS, CONVERTS PROPERTY OF 
ANOTHER, OTHER PARTNERS ARE LIABLE FOR SUCH 
CONVERSION, WHETHER THEY KNEW OF OR PAR-
TICIPATED IN THE CONVERSION OR NOT. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46-0-82, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1943, REQUIRING THE UTAH LIQUOR 
CONTROL COMMISSION TO CONTRACT ONLY WITH 
NATURAL PERSONS AS PACKAGE AGENTS IS ARE-
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STRICTION ON THE POWER OF THE COMMISSION, 
AND CANNOT BE USED BY A NON-CONTRACTING 
PARTNER AS A BAR TO AN ACTION FOR CONVER-
SION !\lADE IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION 
OF A PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS. 
POINT III 
INFORMATION SOUGHT IN DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT ARE EVI-
DENTIARY, AND ARE PROPERLY REACHABLE 
THROUGH DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
ARGUMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
WHERE ONE PARTNER, IN THE COURSE OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS, CONVERTS PROPERTY OF 
ANOTHER OTHER PARTNERS ARE LIABLE FOR SUCH 
CONVERSION, WHETHER THEY KNEW OF OR PAR-
TICIPATED IN THE CONVERSION OR NOT. 
As stated earlier, plaintiff's complaint is drawn, as regards 
defendant Athas, on the theory that all partners are liable 
severally and jointly for the conversions of any partner made 
in the course of the operation of the partnership business. It 
is plaintiff's position that such a complaint states a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
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Section 69-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides: 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any part-
ner acting in the ordinary course of the business of 
the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners 
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a 
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, 
the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent 
as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
Section 69-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, further pro-
vides: 
The partnership is bound to make good the loss: 
* * * ( 2) Where the partnership in the course of its busi-
ness receives money or property of a third person and 
the money or property so received is misapplied by any 
partner while it is in the custody of the partnership. 
Section 69-1-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides: 
All partners are liable: 
( 1) Jointly and severally for everything charge-
able to the partnership under sections 69-1-10 and 
69-1-11. 
* * • 
We believe these sections merely state the common law rule 
as regards liability of partners for wrongful acts of a partner 
in the course of the operation of the partnership business. 
This question was considered by the Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, of New York in the case Brokaw v. Lage et 
al., 196 N.Y.S. 531, 203 App. Div. 155. In that case a question 
similar to the one here involved was considered. The court 
m 196 N.Y.S., page 533, stated: 
Respondent also contends that no cause of action 
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has been stated against this defendant because it is 
not shown that Hammond actively participated in the 
conversion, but the complaint charges a conversion 
during the time defendant Hammond was a member 
of the partnership, and, if such is the fact, he is liable 
for conversion, whether he knew of it or not. 11atter 
of Peck, 206 N.Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
1223·, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 798. 
In the case of Clark v. Ball, 82 P. 529, 34 Colo. 22;., the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that where one member of 
a partnership operating a hotel, absconded with money left 
by plaintiff with the hotel for safekeeping, the other partners 
are liable for such tort. In the case of Nisbet v. Patton, 4 
Rawle (Penn.) 120, 26 Am. Dec. 122, the court held that 
a conversion by one partner of promissory notes in t~e pos-
session of the partnership in the course of its business is the 
conversion of all partners. The question of the liability of a 
partner for tortious acts, including conversion by a partner 
in the course of the partnership business, is discussed in an 
annotation, in 67 Am. St. Rep. 38, "Liability of one partner 
for the tortious acts of another." See particularly page 42 
and 43 of that annotation. 
Plaintiff in its complaint has alleged the existence of a 
partnership known as the Brigham Street Pharmacy. It has 
set forth the facts of the delivery to the defendants at- the 
Brigham Street Pharmacy of liquor, the property of plaintiff. 
Further it has alleged the conversion by the defendants of a 
portion thereof of the value of $37,805.17 (R. 3, 5). Whether 
the disposition of this liquor occurred "in the ordinary course 
of the business of the partnership," we submit, is a matter 
of proof, and we further submit that, under the law, if the 
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liquor, the property of the State of Utah, was handled "in 
the ordinary course of the business of the partnership," the 
question of knowledge of or participation in the conversion 
by defendant Athas is immaterial. 
POINT II 
THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46-0-82, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1943, REQUIRING THE UTAH LIQUOR 
CONTROL COMMISSION TO CONTRACT ONLY WITH 
NATURAL PERSONS AS PACKAGE AGENTS IS A RE-
STRICTION ON THE POWER OF THE COMMISSION, 
AND CANNOT BE USED BY A NON-CONTRACTING 
PARTNER AS A BAR TO AN ACTION FOR CONVER-
SION MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION OF 
A PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS. 
Section 46-0-82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, provides in 
part: " * * * the said person (package agent) shall be a 
natural person * * * ." Upon the argument for the motion 
to dismiss, it was urged by counsel for defendant Athas that 
this restrictive provision was itself a protection to action of 
this nature against defendant Athas because the contract of 
the package agent was between Lack and the Commission, 
and, therefore, the Commission must look solely to the con-
tracting partner for liquor delivered to the package agency. 
We believe the mere statement of this proposition shows its 
fallacy. If this were so, anyone desiring to convert the prop-
erty of the Liquor Control Commission could, by means of 
forming a partnership and having another partner contract 
10 
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with the Commission as package agent, appropriate liquor 
knowingly and intentionally avoid civil liability therefor. 
An analagous argument was used by the defendant m 
the case of State vs. Lack, ---- Utah ____ , 221 P. 2d 852. It 
was urged that in that case that a criminal action for em-
bezzlement would not lie against the defendant inasmuch as 
Section 46-0-70 required the consent of the Governor before 
an action could be taken against an employee or agency of 
the Liquor Control Commission and such consent had not 
been obtained. This court disposed of that argument by point-
ing out that the purpose of that statute was not to place a 
restriction upon criminal actions against such employees, but 
was rather a limited and conditional waiver of the immunity 
of the State and its officials to civil suit. That portion of 
Section 46-0-82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, requiring that 
the Liquor Control ~ommission contract only with a natural 
person is a restriction upon the Commission itself, and we 
believe cannot be used as a shield by a non-contracting partner 
in an action such as this. If such restriction were to shield 
a non-contracting partner for conversion where such partner 
had no knowledge of the conversion, then it would follow 
that the shield would remain though the non-contracting part-
ner knew of and participated in the conversion: 
POINT III 
INFORMATION SOUGHT IN DEFENDANT'S MO-
TION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT ARE EVI-
DENTIARY, AND ARE PROPERLY REACHABLE 
11 
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THROUGH DISCOVERY PROCEDURES UNDER THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
As stated heretofore in connection with the motion to 
dismiss, the defendant Athas intetposed a motion for a more 
definite statement on the ground that "The complaint, and 
each cause, is so vague and ambiguous that this defendant 
cannot frame a responsive pleading, * * *" (R. 16). The 
motion then sets forth five bases for the alleged ambiguity 
(R. 16-17): 
a. It is not clear as to which defendant, it is claimed, 
agreed to or did operate the package agency. 
b. It is not clear whether it is claimed that all the 
liquor delivered, or involved, was delivered by plaintiff 
to defendant Lack, who was certified as its agent and 
employee; or whether all, or part, was delivered by 
it to the drug store partnership, or to this defendant; 
or whether all the liquor delivered, was delivered to 
the same party or parties. 
c. It is not clear as to who, it is claimed, "sold and 
otherwise disposed" of the quantity of liquor described 
(par. 7, both causes); or whether the agent legally, 
or the partnership, or this defendant illegally engaged 
in this; or whether it or he received any proceeds from 
sales thereof; or how, or by what facts or acts of his, 
this defendant is claimed to have engaged in these 
matters of pure conclusions, as alleged, if it is so claim-
ed. Was his possession given him by plaintiff, or by its 
agent, or is the possession of its agent claimed to be 
possession by this defendant. Were the matters, alleged 
as conclusions, of "sale and disposition," by Lack, as 
. plaintiff's alleged agent, or, what is the factual basis 
of claim against this defendant. Did he receive, sell, 
or dispose of any liquor, or receive any money from 
such sales. 
12 
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d. It is entirely unclear as to what is meant or claimed 
by the allegations (par. 7, both causes) that "defend-
ants wrongfully converted the value thereof," and as 
to how, it is claimed, this defendant did or could con-
vert a "value" to his own use, and, particularly, a 
value of liquor "otherwise disposed of" by someone. 
And, also, \vhether, and if so, how, or by what facts or 
acts, it is claimed, this defendant had possession of 
either property or money of plaintiff, so as to convert 
the same, or if this is claimed. 
e. The complaint is ambiguous as to whether this 
defendant is attempted to be charged here on the basis 
of his acts, or on some theory of acts by his agent; and, 
if the latter, as to what the factual basis is for charg-
ing him with conversion by an agent; and, also, when, 
and as to what, and how, or on what theory, the acts 
of his agent could or did bind him, as a converter of 
plaintiff's property. 
As regards paragarph "a" of this motion, we believe it 
suffices to state that it is alleged in the complaint that the 
Brigham Street Pharmacy was operated as a partnership, the 
liquor was delivered to the Brigham Street Pharmacy, and 
that the defendants converted this liquor in the course of the 
partnership operation. This basis for the motion for a more 
definite statement is merely another attack upon the plaintiff's 
theory of the case--that all partners are liable for the conver-
sion of one partner in the course of the operation of the part-
nership business. 
As regards .paragraph "b" of the motion set forth above, 
we need merely point out that the complaint alleges in clear 
and unambiguous terms in paragraph 6 of each count (R. 
2, S) that the plaintiff "delivered to the defendants at the 
Brigham Street Pharmacy" the liquor converted. 
13 
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Paragraph "c'~ of the above motion is again addressed to 
the plaintiff's theory of the case as set forth ·in the complaint. 
That paragraph of the motion is, we believe, aimed at pro-
curing evidentiary matter, which under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure should properly be sought by means of dis-
covery. Furthermore, if thf plaintiff's theory as set out in 
the complaint suffices to defeat a motion to dismiss, then the 
matter sought in paragraph "c" is immaterial. 
We believe the same argument defeats paragarph "e" of 
the defendant Athas' motion as set out above. 
As answer to the arguments set forth in paragraph "d'' 
of the motion cited above, we need merely refer the court to 
Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules were 
in force when this motion was interposed, and, therefore, should 
govern the procedure in considering that motion, Rule 1, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. As stated the complaint in this 
action was drafted under the procedure existing prior to the 
adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant 
has drafted his motions under the same rules. Had plaintiff's 
complaint herein been drawn under the provisions of Rule 8, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, then the motion cited above 
might well have been considerably more lengthy. This matter 
is discussed in 2 :Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., page 2278, 
et seq. In speaking of the Federal rules, it is therein stated 
(pages 2283-2284) "The framers of the Rules did not intend 
that compliance with Rule 8 should expose a plaintiff to a 
motion under 12 (e). For purposes of obtaining detailed 
information as to the cause of action or defense and of limiting 
the issues to be tried, simple and expeditious methods are 
provided in Rules 16 and 26-37." See also, Fed. Rules Di-
14 
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gest, p. 145 et seq. ( 12e) and Cum. Supp. thereto, p. 41 et seq. 
We believe the defendants' motion to dismiss should have been 
denied. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff's complaint in this action as regards the defendant 
Athas states, we believe, a claim against the defendant Athas 
for the conversion of the property of the plaintiff by a partner-
ship of which defendant Athas was a member. We respect-
fully submit that if the plaintiff can prove, as a matter of fact, 
that the liquor, property of the plaintiff, was handled and 
sold in the course of the partnership operation and a conversion 
by one or all the partners was made of such liquor or the pro-
ceeds therefrom, then the participation in such conversion or 
the knowledge thereof of one of the partners is immaterial. 
We believe that a complaint which states such claim is not 
subject to a motion to dismiss and further, if not subject to 
a motion for a more definite statement. We respectfully sub-
mit that the plaintiff's complaint in this case states such a 
claim clearly and unambiguously and the trial court in granting 
defendant Athas' motion was in error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
IRA A. HUGGINS, 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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